What is China’s grand strategy? What are the PRC’s principles in foreign affairs, and how does it’s government structure inform matters of decision-making?
These are some of the questions we attempted to answer on this episode of Pacific Polarity with retired Senior Colonel Zhou Bo. During his career in the People’s Liberation Army, Zhou engaged extensively with foreign counterparts and was a consistent participant at the Shangri-La Dialogue. Today, as a senior fellow at Tsinghua University’s Centre for International Security and Strategy (CISS), he continues to share China’s perspectives on security issues with the world.
A longer summary can be accessed here.
Jersey Lee
Welcome to Pacific Polarity. Today we're talking with Zhou Bo. Zhou Bo is a retired senior colonel of the People's Liberation Army, whose military service started in 1979. He later served in various foreign engagement postings in the Ministry of National Defense of China, including as director of the Center for Security Cooperation in the Office for International Military Cooperation.
He was also a visiting fellow to the Land Warfare Study Centre of the Australian Army in 1999. And he is now a senior fellow at the Centre for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University.
Richard Gray
So Zhou Bo, it's a pleasure to be speaking with you. I think to begin the conversation, I wanted to take a general look at Great Power Strategy and how the US and Chinese approaches have similarities and potentially differences.
I'm from the United States and I've spent some time working in Washington, engaging in different types of mechanisms of U.S. power. And when I try to distill what American power is, at its most simple form, I think it can sort of be broken down into three parts. The first is regional engagement. This is in many ways geographic. The U.S. in many ways is blessed in its geography being bordered by ocean, ocean, Canada, Mexico. And so this is sort of a balancing of a maritime position, the Pacific and the Atlantic, and then also a land presence in the Western Hemisphere.
In periods when the United States has exerted greater power projection, prioritization of these different territories is more opaque. And this is when we lead to more emphasis on firefighting in the Middle East.
Second, in terms of administrative coordination, depending on the policy and period, There's been harmony and conflict between the White House and Congress on foreign affairs. And this sort of trickles down throughout American society. And this is when eventually politicization comes into the American foreign policy process, when there's some level of gridlock.
And then third, in terms of institutional involvement, since the end of World War II, the US has sort of been the center of global finance, producing the world's most stable long-term assets and treasury bonds.
And the Federal Reserve has in some ways played a role in resolving global monetary crises. And even as the US pulls away from multilateralism today, it's still the greatest financial contributor to multilateral institutions. In 2022, it provided about 45% of the UN's institutional funding. And it's still the largest foreign direct investor, even in Southeast Asia.
The situation of China is somewhat different. So China shares a land border with 14 countries and a maritime border with nine, not all of which are traditionally as easygoing as Canada. China does not have the same sort of treaty alliance networks as the United States does, focusing more so on strategic partnerships, giving flexibility and things of this sort.
And administratively, China's foreign affairs governance is a little bit more centralized between the Central Military Commission and state councils. And then institutionally, China's building additional multilateral frameworks through things like BRICS, the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and so on.
And so with this frame in mind, I wanted to ask you about the ways you think about the internal and external components of China's global strategy and what China's policy making process actually is. And I guess maybe a more specific way to look at it, what are some things that outsiders looking in on the Chinese decision making should know about the Chinese system as they make analyses and predictions about what's happening?
Zhou Bo
Well, a good description of the United States and China. When it comes to China's role, I think this picture is very, very big. It depends on which part you are really referring to. I think to put it in a simple picture, I think a few people disagree to China's rise, which looks inexorable.
But then of course, people have a lot of feeling of uncertainty, or even fear towards China. And this is precisely why I have recently published a book, Should the World Fear China.
But actually, this world, I believe, really depends on where you are standing. If you stand in Africa, probably you won't care that much about China's image that looks different in Western countries. Generally speaking, African countries would welcome China's presence there. And in Latin America, I think China's image is also positive. Well, at least it is half and half probably. Yeah, I mean China versus the United States.
But in the Indo-Pacific, yeah, this picture is a bit patchy. We have those countries, as you have mentioned, who still have territorial disputes with China. So it's my argument that China has no so-called spheres of influence. Because if China does, then of course it has to be in China's periphery.
But if you look at China's periphery, in Northeast Asia, we have DPRK who won't listen to China necessarily. Probably on most of the issues, including nuclear issues, And in Southeast Asia, we have other countries who have disputes with China, and some of them are American allies.
But in spite of this, it's interesting that ASEAN's approval rate of China last year is slightly higher than its approval rate of the United States. And what's the reason behind? Well, if I can use one word, Well, this could be too simplistic, but if I use one word, the word is Gaza, right? You can imagine the effect on Muslim countries like Malaysia and Indonesia. And of course, we have some problems with India, but things are moving slowly in the right direction. People are talking about direct flight and so on and so forth.
Well, when it comes to China's domestic decision-making, again, it depends on which department you are in, right? For the military, of course, it's a central military commission. And then, of course, we have a state council.
These, of course, are decision-making bodies. But you're right. I think China's decision-making is more centralized. So this strikes a huge, huge difference between China and the United States. Well, it's hard to say which is good, which is bad. It's meaningless for us to compare these kind of systems.
But China's system, I think, has a kind of similarity with those in the past, because we have not gone through any period of the Western liberal democracy. So in terms of structure, there is a kind of a consistency in our structure in decision making.
Jersey Lee
So I was about to bring up your book, but you brought it up first in your response. You also mentioned just that China does not want to seek spheres of influence, which you had also mentioned in that book specifically. But in that book as well, you mentioned that China had previously already changed a number of defense policies, such as in terms of not stationing troops abroad, not establishing military bases overseas, and not conducting joint exercise with foreign armed forces. China also changed other principles, such as respect for territorial integrity as a fundamental principle.
[In the book], you mentioned that you hope China will continue to be cautious in its use of force, not seek spheres of influence, as you mentioned, not seek military alliances and maintain no first use of nuclear weapons. So how confident can we be that these principles will remain or should a changing external environment lead to a shifting approach?
And I guess should countries in the region try to, to some extent, hold China accountable to these principles or these things that you mentioned China should maintain?
Zhou Bo
Well, this is really a fascinating question because as I have argued, I think there are two challenges for China. And for the first challenge, basically China has proven it could overcome this challenge. That is to prove that China's rise is peaceful.
Because for the last 40 years and plus, China has indeed demonstrated that it can rise peacefully, and this is unprecedented almost historically for such a juggernaut like China to rise so peacefully. But the second one is for the future, is that whether a strong China, which is almost next to none, could actually behave peacefully, not like a hegemon. So we don't know that yet.
So that is why I actually have suggested that even if China becomes developed, it could still stick to some old principles that would be useful. When I talk about old principles, you are correct to point out that China actually has abolished some principles, such as no stationing of troops overseas, like all these kind of principles.
And why is that? That is because, in the past, we saw that by demonstrating these principles, we showed that China is committed to non-interference in the domestic affairs of other countries. So no joint excises, no station of troops, no military bases. But then we realized that actually the international environment has changed, actually people would want you to do more. And the people would hope that you can show them more international responsibilities. So therefore, that is why gradually these principles, which were once taken as golden rules, eventually were given up.
For example, we started to have the first joint excise with Kyrgyzstan, in 2002. Before that, this is a principle that we do not have exercises with anyone. And now, of course, you can see PLA having exercises with so many other countries.
But as I have indicated in my book, I hope PLA can still, or even China can still stick to some principles, such as not trying to seek spheres of influence. So why is that? Because in this way, it is most affordable and it is so easy, you don't have to “herd the cats”, because if you start to establish a sphere of influence, then you need allies, and you would come into alliance, and alliance is expensive, and sometimes it's just like “herding the cats”.
If you do not seek, if you do not have a kind of religious mission, if you do not want to please the whole world, why would you bother to do all this?
If you just look at the PLA under scrutiny, you would find that all that the PLA has been doing overseas so far are just humanitarian operations, be it peacekeeping, counter-piracy, or disaster relief. So these are not accidental. It's a kind of a policy choice. So if all these humanitarian operations are humanitarian in nature, other people would be grateful for you, right? Because there is no debate about the nature of such kind of operations.
But if you start to coming to alliance, if you start to have operations here and there, with different names, different excuses, different alibis, but what are the results? The results are that many people would die. And even in the United States, I believe Americans have a lot of reflections over many wars, and have concluded that a lot of wars went in wrong ways. But this is something I believe China should try its best to avoid.
Richard Gray
So I want to ask now about asymmetric capabilities in terms of the conflict toolkit. So Sort of in response to the American tariffs and previous rounds of US export controls, China's been building its own regime to restrict the export of dual use critical minerals. I guess I'm curious to hear your thoughts about some of these nascent areas, including but not limited to critical minerals. And are you concerned about some of these new domains of competition, which potentially could lead to greater escalation?
Zhou Bo
Well, it depends on really what area you are referring to? The trade war is really complicated, right? But what we're seeing now is that Donald Trump has launched a trade war against the whole world. The only thing that is different is the country's specific policies.
China, of course, has to bear the most serious blow. So China has to make some responses. But I think China also has its own toolkit, as you have mentioned, not only in the rare earth, but I believe, I read something that is from some of American reports, it tells that because the US relies so heavily on China to provide the daily necessities, this kind of a trade war eventually would not make the United States gaining much. So we're still in the fog of war, right, this trade war.
But I think the Chinese government has shown a kind of consistency in its policies, and a kind of determination that cannot be misinterpreted. So we will have to see.
And I just don't know whether there are serious negotiations between two sides. Donald Trump has also mentioned that he would expect a kind of deal could be reached in a few weeks, so that means something must be going on. I hope we will kind of reach a kind of agreement that is good for both sides
Jersey Lee
So in terms of the potential for an armed conflict between China and the US, you always mention that you think it's more likely that it would occur over the South China Sea than Taiwan. However, as you see naval buildup and exercises near the Taiwan Strait, including recent social media footage of potential landing barges in Guangdong, as well as some of the heightened rhetoric coming from both sides. Does some of these signals change your thinking a bit? Are they simply assertive acts to deter certain behaviors, a reaction to America's presence, or how would you read this?
Zhou Bo
Well, I haven't changed my conclusion because, yes, most people are talking about the prospect of a war in Taiwan Strait. But for that to occur, you see, should there be a war, of course, it means that the mainland has lost its patience finally and decided to go with an attack. But this decision won't be easily made, right?
So therefore, that is my argument, that a war or a conflict in Taiwan Strait can hardly be triggered by accident. But this could very much happen in South China Sea. Because no matter what China says, the U.S. would keep on sending aircraft and ships that are simply too many, to come to South China Sea.
And one of the “dangers” is that PLA is getting stronger. So when PLA is getting stronger, it would become less tolerant toward what it sees as American provocations. So therefore, it would send aircraft and ships to intercept these activities that it perceived as provocative. Therefore, this kind of danger over getting too close to each other simply becomes dangerous.
That is why American Pentagon has concluded that in two years’ time, the PLA conducted more than 180 interceptions of American aircrafts, that virtually would mean one interception every four days. So of course, this is dangerous, right? This sounds very, very dangerous.
So that is why I conclude that it is far more dangerous than in Taiwan Strait. But there is a difference. Even if there is a danger or even another collision, or it might even be deadly, I don't believe that an incident in the South China Sea will easily spill over into major conflict between China and the US. That is the difference. But should there be a war in Taiwan Strait, then I believe probably it's an all-out war. It won't be on a small scale. That is the difference.
Jersey Lee
So do you think that Trump's erratic approach, that we perhaps see more in terms of trade, but we could potentially see in other domains as well, do you think that will lead increase or decrease the likelihood of armed conflict between the US and China?
Zhou Bo
So far, there is no direct relevance to the issue because a lot of people ask me how would China respond to Trump's possible behaviors, you know, on the Taiwan issue. But the fact is that he actually didn't say much about Taiwan issue, right? Except that the Taiwanese have to pay.
Then that seems to be the only thing he said in his second term. Then, of course, this can invite questions. What do Taiwanese have to pay? Is it paying for more American arms sales? So how would this arm sells look different from those sold to Taiwan by his predecessors?
Because even in American think tanks, there are some arguments going on as to what kind of combat platforms or weapons are most suitable for Taiwanese. Some people actually suggest it's better to sell them short-range missiles or sea mines or drones, these kind of things they believe would be far more important than the aircraft, ships, all these kind of things.
But then I believe there is another question. Those big combat platforms will certainly make more money, right? Even one aircraft could be more expensive than 100 drones altogether. But think of what American military industrial complexes would they think. If Trump wants them to pay, isn't it better for them to buy this bigger and more expensive stuff?
Basically, we don't know much about Trump's administration's attitude toward this issue. What I assume is that they will continue to talk about the one-China policy, because all the American governments will talk about it, but the content actually have changed a lot.
So they will keep on talking about this because this would be easy for them. But whatever they do, they will say it is still within the context of one China policy. The question is, China's government probably doesn't believe in that, right? So if China's government doesn't believe in that, then things could change.
Jersey Lee
So you mentioned in your last response that China's growing strength means that it's changing its behavior as it pertains to the South China Sea, as it pertains to Taiwan. Now, this goes back somewhat to our early discussion, although that was about principle, not necessarily approach. But I guess there is broader concerns that China might change how it approaches the world or acts in the world as it grows in strength, and the power balance between the U.S. and China shifts in its favor.
Another one of China's principles is non-interference. So this is one area where there's kind of philosophical disagreement between the U.S. and China. So the U.S. sometimes intervenes in conflicts where it perceives a wrong is being committed, whereas the Chinese approach is often more hesitant to intervene in such circumstances. There are obviously advantages and disadvantages to both approaches. So are there any ways you wish China could influence the behaviors of its partners more? Perhaps to some extent as China's power grows, or the external circumstances as you say shifts, it might change its own way of interpreting this past principle?
Zhou Bo
Well first of all I believe there are always something happening here and there, and you would make your own judgment, but my point is if you let the United Nations to make a decision and you follow the decision, probably this decision is a more wise decision rather than your own interpretation, right? So that is why China actually supports the UN in all these military operations.
Peacekeeping of course is always under UN mandate; African Union can, theoretically speaking, also make its own mandates, but so far it hasn't, so all the operations so far are still mandated by the UN, like counter piracy is also mandated by UN, so if you follow these resolutions things could look just easier.
When it comes to such principles of non-interference, actually China still maintain, this is one of the fundamental principles established since the concept of sovereign states becomes rooted according to Westphalia principles and so forth. So you can hardly change that.
But in practice, I think China is becoming increasingly flexible in its practice. For example, because UN has changed this kind of non-interference. I can give an example. After Rwanda's genocide in [1994], it actually provided the determination of the international community to say never again. And it also provides opportunity of soul-searching, what we should do in another similar circumstances. So it actually leads to the discussion over the so-called responsibilities to protect and humanitarian interventions.
For example, there is a Kigali principle, Kigali is the capital of Rwanda, which actually advocates a kind of forced intervention. African Union actually could decide to intervene if it believes that some kind of atrocities is going out of control, or it could break the taboo of non-interference into another country's sovereignty. So African Union can do that. So there is a Kigali principle, but China did not join this principle because of its own respect to its own principle.
But in practice, the United Nations has established the so-called Vanguard Brigade, which is composed of 4,000 people, selected from member states and these troops are required to come to the rescue of civilians within 60 days, the shortest possible time for UN, because it needs a lot of things like intelligence, information, logistical supplies and so forth. And out of these vanguard brigade, a lot of them are Chinese. So far, they have not used this vanguard brigade. So that is China's flexibility between the principles and between its real practice.
Richard Gray
And so in your view, what are some of the shared interests between the United States and China? You have to talk about some of the mutual benefits that have sort of been in existence in the international system through multilateral institutions, but also the interaction between different nation states.
However, it seems as though when we think about US-China relations, the commercial ties that have sort of been developed over the past half century have produced certain benefits with economic winners and obviously the rise of the Chinese middle class, that also is not translated to cooperation between the US and China in non-economic domains.
And it's also on the economic sphere created a paradigm of economic security, where we're leading towards more economic conflict between the two powers. And so I guess, how do you think about what existing shared interests there are, and perhaps where those could be expanded?
Zhou Bo
Well, it depends on which areas you're talking about. In terms of the economy, China's government always insists that there's a great complementarity between the two economies. Right now, Donald Trump doesn't think like that. So we have to see what would happen after the dust falls.
But in many other areas, I would say that at least in theory, there is a greater scope for cooperation between China and the US than between the United States and the Soviet Union, because this relationship is not hostile yet. Some Americans would just describe China as enemies, but that is not American government position.
So I think we have a lot of areas where we have to cooperate. You just watch how, for example, Biden administration has changed its tone. During the first term of the Trump administration, there are very few areas where cooperation is mentioned except in climate change. That is obvious because if we do not cooperate, all people will die. Then sometimes they talk about how we have to cooperate on non-proliferation and that's all.
But when it comes to Biden administration, certainly more and more areas of potential cooperation are mentioned, because I believe they realize without China's cooperation, it's simply impossible for the United States to solve the problem single-handedly, and it will be certainly too tiring for the United States.
In this administration, no matter how hostile Donald Trump seems against China, even talking about how China can help in the war Ukraine, so I think he instinctively realized that there are a lot of things that need China's help.
Jersey Lee
Going back to your book, Should the World Fear China, you mentioned that there was never a liberal international order. However, for people in the West, it felt very real. And we did see a real reduction in armed conflict compared to the historical norm, unprecedented prosperity, that includes the rise of China.
Given the effective collapse of institutions like the WTO, the weakening of the UN, the undermining of other norms of international behavior, the old order, regardless of what we call it, clearly feel like it's slipping away. Can an alternative international order or whatever will take shape in the coming years provide something better than the previous did in terms of conflict reduction, economic growth, et cetera?
Zhou Bo
Well, first of all, I really do not buy this concept of liberal international order. The reason is very simple, because I think the mistake of the West is that it just takes the rules and the regimes in economic field and some of the institutions that the West led to establish, such as IMF, World Bank and so on and so forth, as an order. But the order actually is something much, much bigger.
It should include, as I have indicated, a lot of things such as your national identity, your culture, your religions, and above all, different civilizations. If you put all this together, yeah, that is the international order.
And if you just believe, you know, the order of the Second World War, is liberal international order, that is a kind of historical myopia, because you are just focused on some specific areas. But then, if you just unfold this whole period, you will see so many other things. For example, we have 51 African countries actually became independent after World War II. You can imagine the independence of more than 50 countries, how it could have changed the international order. Is it because of liberal international order? Of course not, because these countries just become independent.
And China actually has provided them a lot of assistance in sending even PLA officers to train these people, more than 10,000 people at least, the so-called freedom fighters. And then India is one of the founders of the non-aligned movement. China has huge influence in the third world.
And then of course, there is decades long rivalry between two camps. All this happened after the second World War and even China's rise. So how can you just describe this whole thing as a liberal international order? So that's my belief. There is never anything called liberal international order, just giving that definition to order would be most challenging. I think it's more difficult than trying to define terrorism, right? But I believe that basically order is like a forest or it's like a garden. It's full of different fauna, flora. So it is holistic, it is diversified. And that makes the garden beautiful.
Jersey Lee
So quickly on that, my question was kind of getting at, okay, regardless of what order came before, the old garden clearly is in a process of change. Are we changing in a better direction? Are we changing in a direction that leads to even less conflict than before or even more economic growth than before? Because right now it doesn't look like it's leading to less conflict or more economic growth.
Zhou Bo
That's a really good question because I won't say that I would necessarily have more confidence in the future. For example, the Munich Security Conference this year has concluded that the world is moving towards a multipolarization. This is interesting. Why? Because previously, Munich Security Conference seems to be caught more in a kind of mood, like the question, is the international order falling apart or lose-lose Westlessness, but to describe it as multipolarization gives you a sense of direction for the first time.
And it is also reflected in the practice where they're trying to invite more countries from global south to attend their conference, because the Munich Security Conference understandably is Eurocentric.
But then, even if we're moving in this direction, which is clear, will this world become necessarily safer or even better? I have no conclusion because, for example, it depends on how the U.S. look at this. If U.S. believes that it is declining and it is looking for enemy or at least competitors, this would actually add to the insecurity of the world. So that is my conclusion.
If you believe this is not a liberal international order, and historically speaking, now as in the past, it always has to be a coexistence of different cultures, different civilizations, then you would ask yourself this question, how can I coexist with other people of other cultures, of other civilizations, instead of looking for enemies. So if you have this mentality, then things would be easier. But if you think like Donald Trump, that the United States in a carnage, and I'm the man to lead America to greatness again, then if this philosophy of making America great again has to be based upon the sacrifice of other nations, this world will not necessarily look safer, I would say.
Richard Gray
And so to close our conversation, can you describe some of the work that you're doing at the Center for International Security and Strategy? What role do you think think tanks play in contemporary Chinese society? And what impact do you hope to make with your thought leadership?
Zhou Bo
The Center for International Security Strategy, where I'm working, is just one of the think tanks in China. I think it is part of the Tsinghua University, which is one of the best universities in China. So therefore, it is a good think tank, and I think it is also influential. It has drawn a lot of attention.
I think for think tanks, around the world, more or less the missions are the same, right? We provide food for thought, and whether it could really influence government or not, it depends on what kind of proposals you have made.
But I believe that ours are influential and it has drawn a lot of attention, including attention from the different departments of the Chinese government. So I'm happy now, as a retired man, I can work on another front.
Richard Gray
All right, great. Well, thank you so much. We really enjoyed speaking with you.
Jersey Lee
Thank you for speaking with Pacific Polarity.
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